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Abstract
In industries with large sunk costs, the investment strategy of competing firms
depends on the regulatory context. We consider ex-ante industrial policies in which the
sunk cost may be either taxed or subsidized, and antitrust policies which could be either
pro-competitive (leading to divestiture in case of high ex-post profitability) or lenient
(allowing mergers in case of low ex-post profitability). Through a simple entry game
we completely characterize the impact of these policies and examine their associated
dynamic trade-offs between the timing of the investment, the ex-post benefits for the
consumers, and the possible duplication of fixed costs. We find that merger policies
are dominated by ex-ante industrial policies, whereas the latter are dominated by
divestiture policies only under very special circumstances.
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1 Introduction
In 2013, the UK government struck a deal with the French utility EDF to build the coun-
try’s first new nuclear plant in a generation (Financial Times, October 21, 2013). The deal
guaranteed a price in real terms for 35 years that roughly doubled the current price. In
2014, the UK Competition Commission required that, notwithstanding the late introduction
of a new player in 2013 (Mittal), the cement market structure remained too concentrated,
and that the dominant players in UK (Lafarge-Tarmac and Hanson) should divest plants
to a newcomer (The Telegraph, October 9, 2014). The first example illustrates that indus-
trial policies, and in particular those targeted to mitigate climate change, aim to promote
investment possibly to the detriment of the consumers’ future welfare due to limited future
competition. The second example illustrates that antitrust polices aim to increase current
consumer welfare, possibly to the detriment of future investment (and future welfare).
This paper explores the interaction between investment and regulatory policies. In par-
ticular, we aim to capture a fundamental ingredient in the underlying welfare analysis, the
interdependencies between such regulatory policies that may often be shortsighted, as well
as their possible feedback on the long term investment efforts of firms. To this end, we
build upon a simple framework used by Cabral (2004) that is known in the literature as the
grab-the-dollar game (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.127 for a textbook introduction).
Grab-the-dollar games are the stationary variant of Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985) seminal
work on preemptive strategic investment when the industry exhibits natural monopoly fea-
tures.1 In a grab-the-dollar game such as the one we analyze, a limited number of firms
repeatedly decide whether or not to invest in a market. Investment is costly and irreversible.
After some random time which may eventually be very long and is endogenously determined
to some extent, no outsider further invests, and the market structure remains stationary. The
limited size of the market implies that ex-post market structure may be either profitable or
not.
This model provides a stylized and analytically tractable framework to discuss the wel-
fare impact of entry dynamics. Indeed, Cabral (2004) discusses whether some structural
characteristics may lead to a situation of over-investment or under-investment. In case of
over-investment (under-investment), the total discounted social welfare would increase (de-
crease) if investment were taxed (subsidized). We revisit this welfare analysis whenever the
1As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), most of the literature has analyzed games with complete information.
In particular, natural extensions of their duopoly setting to one of oligopoly have been studied by Vettas
(2000) and Shen and Villas-Boas (2010) (in stationary settings) as well as Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler
(2014) (in nonstationary settings). It is worth noting though that Levin and Peck (2003) have analyzed a
stationary variant of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) when the sunk cost of entry borne by each firm constitutes
private information.
1
social planner commits to some antitrust policy before firms choose their investment behav-
ior. We consider three antitrust policies: no intervention, i.e., the base case for the model; a
”lenient” policy in which mergers are allowed whenever the ex-post market structure gener-
ates a profitability deemed too low; a ”pro-competitive” policy in which divestiture is forced
whenever the ex-post market structure generates a profitability considered high. The im-
pact of such an active antitrust policy will always be favorable ex-post. The model allows
for exploring the feedback of investment on ex-ante welfare, which constitutes the focus of
the analysis.
There is already a significant amount of literature on the interaction of certain competi-
tion policies and R&D incentives, pioneered by Segal and Whinston (2007). Shapiro (2012)
provides a useful and recent discussion of the interaction of merger policy and R&D, as
opposed to the main focus of Segal and Whinston (2007) on exclusionary behavior. Gans
and Persson (2013) extend Segal and Whinston’s (2007) framework to show that innovation
policy and antitrust policy complement each other when firms can engage in cooperative
forms of R&D such as licensing. See also Baker (2007) for various economic arguments of
when antitrust interventions are most likely to foster innovation. As for R&D, antitrust
policy concerns the extent of market power that should be allowed ex-post but the public
good nature of R&D implies that both the welfare analysis and the regulatory instruments
differ from the ones we highlight.
In contrast with the R&D literature, there has been much less research on the interdepen-
dence of entry incentives and antitrust policy. To the best of our knowledge, Gowrisankaran
(1999) is the first one to point out this issue relative to merger policy. Typically, the welfare
analysis of mergers is done in a static framework (see e.g. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds,
1983, and Farrell and Shapiro 1990), but Gowrisankaran (1999) develops a dynamic com-
putational model along the lines of Ericson and Pakes (1995) in which firms endogenously
decide whether or not to merge at each period. Allowing for mergers has an impact on the
entry probability, the long term market structure, and eventually the associated welfare.
This model is intended to illustrate that it could be feasible to carry out a welfare analysis in
a concrete antitrust case. More recently, Mason and Weeds (2013) have examined the effect
of merger policy on entry incentives when an incumbent is already active in the market.
They analyze some determinants of the socially optimal merger policy, and then compare
it with an entry subsidization policy. Their paper and ours differ in a number of respects:
policies in our setting are set before the market structure forms, and our parameters of in-
terest are the size of the sunk costs of entry and the intensity of competition, whereas they
study changes in other parameters; we also consider a larger range of policies, such as forced
divestiture. Despite these differences, it is worth noting that our results confirm their find-
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ing that merger policy is dominated by ex-ante industrial policy when firm subsidies involve
negligible distortions at the economy-wide level.2
Our model allows for an extensive analysis of the impact of an antitrust policy with
respect to three key aspects: ex-post welfare (consumer surplus and industry profits per
period once the market structure becomes stationary), the delay to achieve the stationary
market structure, and cost duplication. We shall not only consider allowing or not for
mergers, but also analyze an antitrust policy which forces divestiture in case that a highly
concentrated market arises. We obtain a complete characterization of the conditions under
which the ex-ante discounted welfare increases when the feedback on investment is taken
into account. Moreover, these antitrust policies will be compared to an ex-ante industrial
policy which would either subsidize or tax investment.
We shall proceed as follows. In our framework, for analytical tractability, the number of
competing firms is limited to two, as in Cabral (2004) and Mason and Weeds (2013). In a
static context, the investment cost and the market size would be such that only a monopolist
is profitable. We consider an infinite-horizon setting in which firms decide their investment
actions simultaneously. In each period, the situation is one of the following three cases: (i)
no firm invested in the past (in which case firms need to decide again whether or not to
invest); (ii) there is a monopoly, and; (iii) there is a duopoly. The latter two cases can be
seen as absorbing states of the game: the firm(s) active in the market remain in place forever,
and the other firm never enters. Following Cabral (2004), it is convenient to formalize the
industry characteristics through two key parameters: the ratio of the investment cost to the
monopoly profit, and the ratio of the duopoly profit to the monopoly profit. The higher the
first parameter, the higher is the potential inefficiency in case of entry cost duplication. The
lower the second parameter, the more intense is the ex-post competition in case of duopoly.
Our main contribution is to shed light on the effects of various commonly used policies
on the ex-ante incentives to invest in a socially optimal manner given that the industry
may end up exhibiting substantial ex-post market power. Thus, we explicitly determine the
unregulated probability of entry for all combinations of our two key parameters, and then
study how such a probability is affected by the various policies examined (i.e., no regulation,
ex-ante industrial policy and ex-post antitrust policies). This allows for an explicit ranking
of all policies in terms of welfare. We show that allowing mergers is always dominated by an
appropriate ex-ante industrial policy, even though it would almost achieve the same welfare
in those cases in which the probability of entry is small. The industrial policy also dominates
2This result follows from their fourth proposition assuming no extra cost of public funds (R = 1), a
welfare function that puts equal weight on consumer surplus and industry profit (λ = 1), and the lack of
”ineffective entry” (ρ = 0).
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the divestiture policy, except whenever the probability of entry is close to one: in such cases,
it would be beneficial to divest a monopoly into a duopoly. As soon as entry becomes less
likely, however, we find that a divestiture policy would completely discourage entry. To the
best of our knowledge, the current work provides the first welfare comparison of policies
that are widely used by government agencies, so we can provide some guidance about their
relative pros and cons.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
solves it for the base case (unregulated equilibrium), and characterizes the optimal industrial
policy. Section 3 analyzes the impact of the antitrust policies (whether to allow mergers or
force divestiture). Section 4 discusses the policy relevance of the results using a numerical
illustration. Section 5 concludes by summing up the results, and suggesting how this work
could be extended.
2 The model
We consider a market for a homogeneous good and two potential entrants. A firm is active
if it has already entered, or else it is inactive. Any inactive firm can enter the market and
immediately become active by paying a fixed sunk cost K > 0. Time is discrete and infinite,
and at each time t = 0, 1, ... inactive firms simultaneously decide whether to enter or not. We
denote pin for the individual per-period profit if n ∈ {1, 2} firms are active in the market, and
we assume it is collected at the end of the corresponding period (this is just a normalization).
Firms discount future payoffs at rate r > 0, with δ ≡ (1 + r)−1 denoting the discount factor.
We assume that
0 ≤ pi2 < rK < pi1, (A1)
so the market has the potential to be profitable for at most one firm and exit never takes
place (voluntarily).
The per-period consumer welfare is denoted by sn if n ∈ {1, 2} firms are active. Also,
wn ≡ sn + npin denotes the per-period social welfare generated by n ∈ {1, 2} active firms.
We use capital letters for discounted streams of surplus: Πn =
∑+∞
t=1 δ
tpin = pin/r for a
firm’s profit, Sn = sn/r for consumers’ surplus and Wn = wn/r for the social welfare if
n ∈ {1, 2} firms are active from the current date on. For convenience, define An ≡ Wn−nK
for n ∈ {1, 2}.
Note that the product homogeneity assumption allows us to write consumer surplus and
social welfare as a function of industry profit: w(npin) and s(npin) (n = 1, 2), respectively.
Thus, wn ≡ w(npin) = s(npin) + npin. Welfare is decreasing with respect to industry profit
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because of the reduction in (allocative) efficiency, so consumer surplus is decreasing in such
a profit with a slope smaller than −1. We shall assume that the per-period social welfare is
weakly increasing and concave in the number of active firms:
w2 ≥ w1 and w1 ≥ w2 − w1. (A2)
The second condition in (A2) asserts that the entry of a single firm creates more gross welfare
than the addition of a second firm; alternatively, a monopoly achieves more than half the
gross welfare gains of a duopoly. A direct implication is that if a monopoly does not create
net welfare (i.e., w1 < rK), then neither will a duopoly.
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Our model can be seen as depending on two key parameters: on the one hand, pi2/pi1 rep-
resents the intensity of competition, ranging from 0 (pure Bertrand competition) to 1/2 (col-
lusion); on the other hand, rK/pi1 represents the profitability of the market for a monopoly:
as rK/pi1 increases from pi2/pi1 to 1, the profitability declines from the limit profitability
needed to sustain a duopoly to the limit profitability needed to sustain a monopoly.
2.1 Unregulated equilibrium
Given our assumptions on profits, there are two stationary equilibria in pure strategies,
with one firm entering in every period and the other staying out. These equilibria are
asymmetric, so each firm should anticipate perfectly its role as an entrant or as a firm that
remains inactive. From now on, we follow Cabral (2004) and consider symmetric equilibria
in stationary strategies. In subgames in which one firm is already active, the other firm
chooses not to enter with probability one. The discounted payoff of an active firm when
n ∈ {1, 2} firms have entered is then Πn, because no further entry will take place. And,
when n ∈ {1, 2} firms have entered, the expected payoff of an inactive firm is zero.
In subgames with no active firm, symmetric behavior can be easily seen to require ran-
domization. In particular, the two inactive firms must be indifferent between entering and
waiting one more period to make the entry decision. Suppose that any one of the inactive
firms chooses to enter with probability p0 ∈ (0, 1). Denote the other one’s expected payoff
if it waits by Vw, and let Ve denote its payoff if it immediately enters, so that stationarity
3Assumption (A2) holds for all pi2 ∈ [0, pi1/2] if and only if it holds for pi2 = 0 (perfect competition), that
is, a monopoly should achieve more than 50% of the maximal welfare. It always holds for the market of a
homogeneous product with p(q) = a− bqα in which α > −1 and bα > 0. In that case, the percentage welfare
loss associated with a monopoly is 1− (2 + α)/(1 + α)(α+1)/α, which is smaller than 50% (for an extensive
discussion of welfare losses in Cournot oligopoly, see Corcho´n, 2008). Furthermore, if the demand function
is concave, Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) show that the percentage welfare loss is at most 33% for a monopoly.
5
yields
Ve = p0Π2 + (1− p0)Π1 −K
and
Vw = (1− p0)δmax(Vw, Ve).
Because Vw = Ve in a mixed-strategy equilibrium with stationary strategies, we have that
Vw = Ve = 0, that is, the equilibrium mixing probability p
∗
0 solves:
p∗0
pi2
r
+ (1− p∗0)
pi1
r
−K = 0. (1)
It readily follows that the equilibrium probability as a function of pi1, pi2 and rK is
p∗0(pi1, pi2, rK) = (pi1 − rK)/(pi1 − pi2), (2)
a positive value not exceeding one because pi1 > rK > pi2. The expected payoff of an inactive
firm in these subgames is E∗0 = 0. That all profits from entry are dissipated in expectation
because of aggressive entry behavior is clear given that there is room for only one firm in the
market. The symmetric equilibrium probability of entry increases as either pi1 or pi2 grow
and as the (per-period) cost of capital rK falls, all of them intuitive results as well.
2.2 Ex-ante industrial policy
Suppose now that a social planner could indirectly control the (nondiscriminatory) entry
probability of firms by somehow taxing or subsidizing the sunk cost. Since a higher (lower)
sunk cost decreases (increases) the entry probability, taxation (subsidization) could be re-
ferred as a situation of “excessive” (“insufficient”) entry. This is indeed the approach followed
by Cabral (2004): he studies the net marginal welfare gain relative to the sunk cost of entry.
Even though he simply focuses on limit cases within the parameter space, we will focus on
the entire parameter space, extending his pioneering analysis. To this end, we shall directly
derive the optimal entry probability and then obtain the related tax or subsidy as well as
the associated welfare.
Recall that Wn denotes the discounted social welfare when n ∈ {1, 2} firms are active
and that An ≡ Wn − nK for n ∈ {1, 2}. If the planner chooses an entry probability of p,
then the equation of motion for expected welfare given that no firm is yet active is
W0(p) = 2p(1− p)A1 + p2A2 + (1− p)2δW0(p), (3)
which gives
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W0(p) =
p[2(1− p)A1 + pA2]
1− (1− p)2δ . (4)
For p ∈ (0, 1), an increase in the probability of entry on welfare has the following effect
(by differentiation of (3)):
[1− δ(1− p)2]∂W0
∂p
= 2p(A2 − A1) + 2(1− p)(A1 − δW0). (5)
An increase in the probability of entry makes it more likely that a duopoly results rather
than a monopoly (first term on the right hand side), but also makes it more likely that a
monopoly results as opposed to having no entry at all (second term). Which aspect dominates
depends upon the probability of entry. The following proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 1 The discounted social welfare stream is (globally) maximized
• at p = 0 if w1 ≤ rK;
• at p = 1 if rK ≤ w2 − w1;
• at
p = p̂ ≡
√
(2w1 − w2)2 + 4(w1 − rK)(w1 + rK − w2)/r − (2w1 − w2)
2(w1 + rK − w2)/r ∈ (0, 1)
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
The social planner trades-off the social cost of capital (rK) against how much competition
it would like to generate, keeping also in mind that entry delays may be socially costly. Given
these aspects that the planner takes into account, the socially optimal probability of entry
captures intuitive features. Indeed, the first two cases are clear: no entry is pursued when
the per-period social cost of capital exceeds the per-period welfare generated by a monopoly;
also, the immediate entry of the two firms is optimal if discounted welfare with a duopoly
relative to a monopoly is higher than the per-period social cost of having one more firm
active in the market. In the third case, that is, in circumstances in which a monopoly would
be the social planner’s preferred market structure if it could directly enforce it, the optimal
probability of entry trades-off the probability of excessive entry with the risk of delay. In
such a case, the optimal probability of entry can be shown to grow as the per-period cost of
capital falls or as the intensity of competition increases, which constitutes our next result.
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Proposition 2 Lowering either pi2 or K lead the social planner to pursue a larger extent of
entry.
Proof. See Appendix.
Based on this proposition and on the fact that the equilibrium probability grows with pi2,
it is clear that, for any K ∈ (0, pi1/r), there exists a value piC2 (K) ∈ (0, pi1] such that there is
excess entry if pi2 > pi
C
2 (K) and insufficient entry otherwise.
4 There is a clear tension related
to the intensity of competition: if competition is more intense, entry is more desirable but
less likely in equilibrium. From a social welfare standpoint, the unregulated equilibrium
results in insufficient entry for low pi2, and in excessive entry for high pi2. As for the entry
cost, an increase in K reduces the equilibrium probability of entry as well as the socially
optimal one. The monotonicity of the comparison is ambiguous. Still, if the fixed cost is large
(close to Π1) the probability of entry is close to zero, and (by Proposition 1, since w1 < rK
in such cases) the unregulated equilibrium probability of entry leads to insufficient entry
because of the cost of delaying an investment that would create some consumer surplus. In
that case, a monopoly is much more likely than a duopoly and the intensity of competition
has a negligible effect on the comparison. In Figure 1, we plot on the (rK/pi1, pi2/pi1)-plane
the areas in which there is socially insufficient entry and socially excessive entry. The shapes
of the areas illustrates the preceding discussion. In figure 1, we use a linear demand and
a constant marginal production cost and r = 0.1 (Cabral, 2004, Fig. 2 depicts r = 0.01).
More on this numerical illustration in section 4.
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Figure 1: The ex-ante industrial policy as a function of the fixed cost (rK/pi1) and the inten-
sity of competition (pi2/pi1) with a linear demand and r = 0.1. The dotted line corresponds
to pi2 = rK.
4Note that Cabral (2004) simply gives sufficient conditions for excessive entry based on pi2, whereas our
conditions are both necessary and sufficient.
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It is worth stressing that, in our framework, maximizing expected total welfare is equiva-
lent to maximizing consumer surplus net of the expected subsidy (provided there is no extra
cost of public funds, an aspect that is easy to incorporate into the analysis). The point is
that all the subsidies received by firms are dissipated due to the more intense competition for
the market (in equilibrium, expected net profits are null). More formally, for a subsidy σ ∈ <
given upon entry, the equilibrium probability of investment becomes p∗(pi1, pi2, r(K − σ)),
written p∗ as a shorthand in the remainder of this subsection. Social welfare in expression
(4) could be rewritten by isolating expected consumers surplus and firm profits. Then with
the aid of expression (1) (having replaced K with K − σ), we can eliminate the profits so
that the following holds:
W0(σ) =
p∗
1− (1− p∗)2δ [2(1− p
∗)(S1 − σ) + p∗(S2 − 2σ)
+2(1− p∗)(Π1 − (K − σ)) + p∗(2Π2 − 2(K − σ))]
=
p∗
1− (1− p∗)2δ [2(1− p
∗)(S1 − σ) + p∗(S2 − 2σ)]
=
p∗
1− (1− p∗)2δ [2(1− p
∗)S1 + p∗S2]− σ,
where σ ≡ 2p∗σ/[1 − (1 − p∗)2δ] denotes the discounted expected public cost of an ex-ante
policy that implements a probability of entry equal to p∗ through a subsidy of size σ. Treating
σ as a function of p∗ helps to clarify the trade-off generated by the ex-ante industrial policy:5
the benefit for consumers owing to a greater probability of entry should be compared with
the larger expected budget of the policy.
3 Ex-post antitrust policies
Two antitrust interventions are considered in this section: allowing duopolists to merge or
forcing a monopolist to divest. Intuitively, allowing mergers would be appropriate in case of
insufficient entry, whereas divestiture would be desirable in case of excessive entry. However,
each antitrust intervention modifies the probability of entry through a modification of the
ex-post profit of firms. Our analysis sheds light on the relationship.
5Note that the subsidy could be written as a function of the equilibrium probability of entry: σ = s(p∗) ≡
(pi1/r−pi2/r)p∗− (pi1/r−K), which is strictly increasing. The expected subsidy σ¯ then becomes a monotone
function of p∗ (differentiation shows that it is strictly increasing), so it is equivalent for the planner to choose
the probability directly or to work with σ¯.
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3.1 Decentralized entry with merger in duopoly
We first consider a situation where the social planner allows firms to merge if the market
structure happens to be a duopoly. When firms are allowed to merge, there is a welfare
loss in the duopoly case relative to the unregulated equilibrium. The possible gain arises
from the greater incentive to enter the market, though. If there is already excessive entry,
allowing merger would both increase the inefficiencies associated to cost duplication and
those associated to market power. Therefore, it can only be welfare enhancing to allow
mergers in situations in which entry is insufficient. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Allowing mergers can only be welfare enhancing in a situation of insufficient
entry.
Further clarification of the relationship between this antitrust policy and insufficient en-
try can be obtained on the basis of Proposition 2 and Figure 1. Entry might be insufficient
because of intense competition (low pi2) or a large fixed cost. If entry is insufficient because
competition is too intense, softening competition by allowing merger cannot increase wel-
fare. However, if entry is insufficient because of a large fixed cost that is hardly covered by
monopoly profit, it could be welfare enhancing to promote entry by allowing mergers. In
such a case, a monopoly is much more likely than a duopoly and still better than nothing, so
sacrificing welfare in the (unlikely) duopoly outcome is worthwhile. This reasoning explains
why, in Figure 1, merger dominates on the right (large fixed cost) of the insufficient entry
area. Even though the linear case is further described in Section 4, the following proposition
formally states this result in the general case.
Proposition 4 For all pi2 there is a threshold entry cost K˜(pi2) below pi1/r such that mergers
should be allowed for K > K˜(pi2).
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2 Decentralized entry with asset divestiture in monopoly
Asset divestitures only concern monopoly situations, and they are modeled in a simple way:
if only one firm happens to enter the industry, the regulator (instantaneously) forces it to
resell half of its assets. Two cases need be distinguished: resale to an outsider firm or resale
to the firm that remains inactive. The latter case is more complicated since a waiting motive
may arise, so we first discuss the former case, and then extend the results to the latter one.
We assume that purchasing divested assets allows a firm to avoid having to pay K. In
these conditions, the divestiture results in a duopoly without duplication of the fixed costs,
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so s1 is equal to s2 and A1 is equal to A2 + K. Even though the regulator cannot directly
control the entry probability, it can indirectly do so via the value of the assets divested.
More precisely, we assume that the regulator can choose the share α ∈ [0, 1] of the value
of divested assets that the divested monopoly obtains, so it holds that pi1 = (1 + α)pi2, and
α can be interpreted as a parameter that captures the incumbent’s bargaining power. If
the planner set institutional rules that induced intense competition for the divested assets, α
would be close to 1; in a situation close to asset expropriation, α would be close to 0, however.
Even if the regulator might not have a large control over α in some occasions, providing the
planner with this lever is useful from an abstract point of view, since it enjoys an additional
instrument to implement its desired outcome. As we shall see, the social planner cannot
improve upon ex-ante industrial policies in many situations even in the best case scenario in
which it has this extra lever at its disposal. And even if it can, this requires a very precise
knowledge of industry features, since small mistakes in their assessment may have dramatic
consequences. As we argue in the next section, this lack of robustness, coupled with the
possibility that it may be hard for the regulator to commit ex-ante to a specific value of α,
suggests that it is hard to defend divestitures as an approach preferred over ex-ante industrial
policy.6
Turning to the formal analysis, when a firm foresees that a monopolist will be (immedi-
ately) forced to divest, the equilibrium entry probability becomes
p∗0 =
(1 + α)pi2 − rK
αpi2
, (6)
which is an increasing function of α, as one would expect. By choosing α, the regulator
can modify the probability of entry without affecting the ex-post efficiency. However, the
regulator is constrained by the total value of the assets. Recalling that pi2 represents the
extent of competition when in duopoly, one can then prove the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the planner can fully control the price of divested assets. Then
there exists pi2 ∈ (rK/2, rK) such that
• if pi2 > pi2, then the planner’s optimal choice is α∗ < 1.
• if pi2 < pi2, then the planner’s optimal choice is α∗ = 1.
• if pi2 < rK/2, entry never occurs and the expected welfare is null.
6Note also that divestiture has no ex-post social costs (e.g., no share of K needs to be paid by the firm
that gets the divested assets), so the scenario we consider should be highly favorable towards divestiture.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition highlights the fact that if competition is anticipated to be mild, entry is
not highly desirable, and in addition the economic value of divested assets is high. Conse-
quently, the regulator can implement the optimal extent of entry given the ex-post duopoly
structure by giving only a share of the value of divested assets to the divested monopoly. If
competition is intense, entry is highly desirable but not very profitable. Taking into account
that the regulator is constrained by the low value of divested assets, the firm that initially
entered as monopolist gets the full economic value of its divested assets, even though this
will still induce insufficient entry from a welfare perspective, given the allocative efficiency
of a duopoly. In the extreme case in which competition is very fierce and the fixed cost of
entry is relatively high, asset divestiture completely eliminates the incentive to enter and the
expected welfare is null. In such a case, a duopoly does not generate enough profit to cover
the fixed cost.
Since the planner can implement the optimal extent of entry for pi2 > pi2, it should come
as no surprise using a continuity argument that asset divestiture is socially useful even when
pi2 is below pi2. In particular, the following holds.
Proposition 6 There is a threshold p˜i2 ∈ (rK/2, pi2) such that expected welfare is strictly
higher with asset divestiture than without it if and only if pi2 > p˜i2.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition can be compared to Proposition 3. When competition is mild (i.e., pi2
has a high value), if there is excessive entry in an unregulated equilibrium, divestiture will
be welfare enhancing as long as the regulator controls the resale value of the assets. In that
case, divestiture achieves both a short-term gain by enhancing competition in the product
market and a long-term one by reducing the extent of entry. However, as will be shown
shortly in our numerical illustration in the next section, it may well hold that divestiture
is welfare enhancing even if there is insufficient entry. This situation arises if the gain in
the post-entry welfare offsets the lower probability of entry. Our illustration will also show
that this gain rapidly turns into a loss as duopoly competition becomes more intense. With
fierce competition, the full value of a duopoly is so low that firms are reluctant to enter
and welfare is reduced. At the extreme, asset divestiture fully discourages entry. To sum
up, while we could expect that divestiture would be an appropriate policy whenever there is
excessive entry, a detailed analysis shows that the situation is not clear-cut.
Suppose now that the assets up for resale are (immediately) bought by the other po-
tential entrant. If only one firm enters, the other firm obtains a profit (1 − α)pi2 from the
divested assets. This profit should be taken into consideration by a firm contemplating the
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profitability of entry. Suppose that a firm enters with probability p0. Then, if the other firm
enters with probability p0 as well, the firm must expect to gain
Ve = p0Π2 + (1− p0)(1 + α)Π2 −K.
Staying out yields
Vw = p0(1− α)Π2 + (1− p0)δmax(Ve, Vw).
In equilibrium, Vw = Ve must hold, so the equilibrium entry probability p
∗
0 solves
p∗0Π2 + (1− p∗0)(1 + α)Π2 −K = p∗0(1− α)Π2
r + 1
r + p∗0
.
The left-hand side is the value of entering, which is decreasing with respect to the probability
that the rival enters, and the right-hand side is the value of waiting and possibly obtaining the
divested assets, which increases with the probability of the rival’s entry. From this equation,
one can conclude that there is a unique equilibrium probability of entry, it is positive if
(1 + α)Π2 > K and null otherwise.
In that case, the equilibrium probability of entry is still increasing with respect to α:
for α = 1, it is equal to the probability obtained with a third party given by equation (6);
otherwise, it is strictly lower if it is positive (i.e., when α > (K − Π2)/Π2) or obviously it
is null. Similar results as those in Propositions 5 and 6 could be obtained, but the value
of the divested assets that a monopoly obtains should be larger in that case, that is, the
regulator should anticipate that the perspective of obtaining the divested assets will soften
the incentive to enter.
4 An illustration
4.1 A linear specification
To illustrate our findings, let us assume that the inverse demand is P (q) = a − bq for a
total production q and that the marginal cost production is constant, in which case we
can set it equal to zero without loss of generality. The unregulated monopoly profit is
obtained for a quantity of qm = a/(2b) and it is equal to pim = bq
2
m = a
2/(4b). Welfare
can be written as a function of the total production q: w(q) = (a − bq/2)q = s(q) + pi∗(q),
where s(q) = bq2/2 stands for consumer surplus and pi∗(q) for industry profit. Note that
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied. Both consumer surplus and welfare could be
written as a function of the industry profit pi∗ as follows: the profit obtained with a production
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q is pi∗(q) = (a − bq)q = pim − b(q − qm)2, so that the quantity q(pi∗) > qm corresponding
to profit pi∗ is q(pi∗) = qm + [(pim − pi∗)/b]1/2, and consumer surplus and total welfare are
s(q(pi∗)) and w(q(pi∗)), respectively.
The results can be displayed in a two-dimensional diagram. The horizontal axis represents
rK/pi1 varying from 0 to 1, whereas the vertical axis represents pi2/pi1 varying from 0 to .5
(that is, as q goes from a/b to qm). In the area in which pi2/pi1 < rK/pi1, Assumption (A1)
is satisfied, i.e. the equilibrium probability of entry is smaller than one. Otherwise, it is
equal to one and the market structure is a duopoly. In the former area, the entry probability
declines as rK/pi1 increases and becomes null exactly when rK/pi1 = 1. In the latter area,
our model should be extended to allow for more competitors.
Without loss of generality, we take a = 1 and b = 1/4 so that pi1 = 1; the discount rate
is r = 0.1, so Π1 = 10. The gross welfare associated with a monopoly is W1 = 15, whereas
the maximum gross welfare obtained with a Bertrand duopoly is W2 = 20.
4.2 Comparison of the policies
Given this specification, we first derive the areas in which there is insufficient entry or
excessive entry, respectively (see Figure 2(a)). In case of insufficient entry, the darker area
depicts a configuration in which the optimal subsidy leads to an entry probability of one,
extending the duopoly area to the right. Conversely for the case of excessive entry, the
duopoly area is restricted on the left.
In Figure 2(b), we depict the optimal antitrust policy. As expected, merger policy dom-
inates only in the area in which there is insufficient entry (Proposition 3). Divestiture may
be optimal whenever these is excessive entry, but this is neither necessary nor sufficient. We
can gain further insights from these results by drawing the welfare as a function of pi2/pi1 for
two given values of rK/pi1, namely 0.6 (high monopoly profit) and 0.9 (low monopoly profit).
This gives Figure 3 and Figure 4. In these figures, the vertical axis units are measured as
a percentage of the welfare obtained with a regulated monopoly, which we denote by WRM
and note that it is independent from the horizontal axis (WRM is obtained by setting the
price of the good so that the per-period profit of the firm equals rK).7 This shows that the
policies at hand induce a large welfare loss, in particular in the case of low monopoly profit
(Figure 4). We shall return to this aspect shortly, but consider first the comparison between
ex-ante and ex-post policies. Observe, on the one hand, that an ex-ante industrial policy
always dominates merger, although the difference gets smaller as rK/pi1 becomes close to 1
7We consider a first-best regulation (having the fixed investment cost be directly paid by consumers while
selling the product at marginal cost) to be irrelevant for our comparison. For an extensive presentation of
the theory of the regulation of a natural monopoly, see Train (1991).
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Figure 2: Optimal policy as a function of the intensity of competition and sunk cost. The
dotted line corresponds to pi2 = rK above it the equilibrium probability of entry is 1. In the
brown area the optimal probability of entry is 1.
(Figure 3). On the other hand, divestiture may be better than an ex-ante industrial policy,
but it may also be much worse; in case of intense duopolistic competition (low pi2/pi1), a
divestiture policy might totally discourage entry.
We return now to the welfare loss. It is conceivable to design a policy that combines
both ex-ante and ex-post features though its implementation is unlikely since it would re-
quire coordination between currently independent regulatory agencies. Such a “hybrid”
policy would encourage investment ex-ante through subsidies but discourage market power
ex-post through divestiture of monopoly. It is a simple matter to prove that this hybrid
policy dominates both a pure ex-ante industrial policy and a pure divestiture policy,8 and
it significantly reduces the welfare loss relative to the case of the regulated monopoly (see
Figures 3 and 4).
It is also important to stress that the policies under consideration differ in terms of
commitment. An industrial policy is a once-and-for-all commitment. For antitrust policies
they are typically implemented after the fact, that is, ex-post and rarely explicit ex-ante. In
our framework, we assume that the authorities can commit ex-ante. To emphasize the role
of this assumption, consider for instance a situation in which the authorities are supposed to
implement an industrial policy and no antitrust policy, and then, after the fact, “hold up”
8With this hybrid policy, the regulator subsidizes entry and divests a monopoly into a duopoly.
Writing W0(w1, w2, r,K, p) in expression (4), it holds that expected welfare with the hybrid policy is
then maxpW0(w2, w2, r,K, p), which is higher than welfare with the ex-ante industrial policy (since
W0(w2, w2, r,K, p) ≥ W0(w1, w2, r,K, p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]), and higher than welfare with divestiture (it is
equal if α < 1 and strictly higher if α = 1).
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Figure 3: Welfare relative to welfare with a regulated monopoly (WRM = 19.3$) as a function
of the degree of competition for K = 0.6pi1/r.
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Figure 4: Welfare relative to welfare with a regulated monopoly (WRM = 17.6$) as a function
of the degree of competition for K = 0.9pi1/r
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a resulting monopolist by forcing it to divest. This may be more realistic than our hybrid
policy.9 It may reduce the welfare loss as long as the firms are myopic. We leave the analysis
of such out-of-equilibrium scenarios for further research.
4.3 How each policy balances the trade-offs
Each policy trades-off three aspects: (i) the ex-post market structure (a duopoly being more
favorable to the consumers; more generally, the probability of getting a monopoly versus that
of getting a duopoly); (ii) the delay in obtaining such ex-post market structure (the earlier
the better, so, everything else equal, a higher probability of entry would be better), and; (iii)
the expected discounted investment costs (a duopoly duplicates fixed costs). Figure 5 and
Figure 6 explicit the trade-offs associated to each policy.
Take the no-merger policy as the benchmark (section 2.1). In a configuration such as
pi2/pi1 = 0.4 and rK/pi1 = 0.6, we have excessive entry (see Figure 2(a)). An ex-ante
policy would tax investment, increase the delay, make a monopoly situation more likely and
reduce the overall expected investment cost. A divesture policy would increase the delay
even further, make sure that a duopoly prevails, and reduce the expected fixed cost even
more. As can be seen in Figure 3, divestiture dominates the ex-ante policy; alas, as soon as
pi2/pi1 < 0.3, divestiture leads to no entry. For rK/pi1 = 0.9, the range on which divestiture
dominates shrinks to approximately [0.46, 0.5] (see Figure 4).
As can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, a merger policy arbitrates in favor of reducing the delay,
at the cost of guaranteeing that a monopoly prevails and at the expense of increasing the
entry cost. It is only appropriate in case of insufficient entry due to a very high investment
cost relative to the size of the market (i.e. rK/pi1 = 0.9). Then its sensitivity relative to
pi2/pi1 is low. The interested reader will note in Figure 7 that differences among policies
persist in the neighborhood of pi2/pi1 = 0.5 for rK/pi1 = 0.9.
4.4 Why a dynamic structure matters
The linear specification can also help to understand the effect of the dynamic structure of our
framework. To do so, it is worth comparing our dynamic game to a “static game” in which
firms first decide whether to enter and then produce to earn the stream Πi for i = 1, 2. This
is the typical framework of a two-stage entry game, and Mason and Weeds (2013) analyze
merger control in such a framework. The difference with the dynamic game is that entry,
9In some sectors such as electricity, we have rather observed a sequence of divestiture of monopolies
followed by investment subsidies for capacity investments. See for instance Busnello (2014) for the Italian
case.
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Figure 5: Expected delay before entry as a function of the degree of competition.
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Figure 6: Expected cost as a function of the degree of competition.
0.498 0.499 0.5
Π2þ1
1.75
1.8
1.85
T
divestiture
divestiture with Α=1
no merger
merger
ex-ante
(a) Delay
0.50.497 0.498 0.499
Π2þ1
8.5
8.45
8.55
E@CD
divestiture
divestiture with Α=1
no merger
merger
ex-ante
(b) Expected cost
Figure 7: Zoom of Delay and Expected cost as a function of the degree of competition for
K = 0.9pi1/r
18
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
rKΠ1
Π
2
Π
1
No merger
Divestiture
Merger
Figure 8: Comparison of the antitrust policies in a two-stage game
in the static game, occurs only once and if a firm does not enter it will never do so. From
the firms’ point of view, the value of entering and staying out are the same in the dynamic
and the static game, so that the equilibrium probabilities of entry are identical in the two
games. However, from a welfare perspective, entry is more valuable in the static game than
in a dynamic game because entry cannot be postponed to the next period in the former
case. The implications are that insufficient entry is more frequent and hence the ex-ante
industrial policy consists of a larger entry subsidy in the static game than in the dynamic
one. Any antitrust intervention that decreases the probability of entry has a larger long-term
welfare cost in the static game. Consequently, the dynamic framework is more favorable to
no merger and divestiture than the static one. To illustrate and quantify the difference, the
optimal antitrust policy in the static game for our linear specification is depicted in Figure
8.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a model in which industrial and antitrust policies can be compared taking
into account the dynamic feedback that these policies generate on the firms’ investment
strategies. In our model, two firms repeatedly compete (through incurring or not a sunk
fixed cost) for a natural monopoly situation: in case only one firm invests, it will secure the
market; in case both firms invest, the discounted stream of duopoly profit will not compensate
the sunk cost of entry. An ex-ante industrial policy takes the form either of a tax or a subsidy
for the investment that allows the regulator to decrease or increase the extent of entry. An
ex-post antitrust policy may either (if pro-competitive) divest a monopoly into a duopoly or
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(if lenient) allow a duopoly to merge into monopoly.
We compare these policies in terms of their discounted welfare, which captures consumers’
surplus, entry delays and the possible duplication of fixed costs. Usually, the industrial policy
dominates the antitrust policies. A lenient policy is relatively good whenever the sunk cost
is so large that the entry probability is very small: in such cases, the loss in consumers’
surplus of allowing a duopoly and the duplication of fixed cost are more than compensated
by the reduction in the entry probability; still, an ex-ante industrial policy would achieve
a somewhat higher welfare. A pro-competitive policy is better than an industrial policy
in specific circumstances, that is, whenever the probability of entry is close to one, but
as this probability decreases such a policy would quickly destroy all investment incentives.
Moreover, in order to be really better than the ex-ante policy, the bargaining power of the
monopolist when reselling its assets may have to be closely monitored by the regulator.
We now discuss both limitations and possible extensions. Our model is limited to two
firms, which is a strong limitation, so it would be useful to extend our results to the case
of an oligopolistic structure involving n > 2 firms. However, this will make the model more
complicated. For instance, assume that the market size is such that it can profitably accom-
modate 4 firms and say that n = 7. Without any policy, the long term market structure may
be 4, 5, 6, 7 (assuming that market structures with 0, 1, 2 or 3 firms would be transient).
The impact of an industrial policy is easily extended, but modeling the impact of antitrust
policies is more elaborate. The targeted market structures for the authorities need to be
defined; this depends on the capacity of the regulator to fully appreciate the structural char-
acteristics of the industry. Also, the merger process needs be precisely designed, eventually
giving up to the convenient assumption of symmetry among firms. Finally, the nature and
the degree of differentiation on the market would need to be more specific, cost functions
and capacity constraints may need to be introduced, etc.
The boundary between an analytical model and a simulation model such as the one in
Gowrisankaran (1999) is easily crossed at the expense of tractability. Despite its simplicity,
we believe that the current model already delivers some qualitative policy recommendations.
Then, on a case by case approach, a more refined model should be made to precisely discuss
the benefits or pitfalls associated with implementations of policies in a real word situation.
We can think of two sectors in which this approach would seem worthwhile. The first one
would require extending the model so that investment leads to a new (green) technology,
whereas firms that do not invest would remain stuck to an old (dirty) technology. Delay
would then be associated not so much with a loss in consumer surplus but rather with
the environmental damage due to the persistence of the old technology. Such an extension
looks both feasible and interesting even in the case of a two-firm model. The competition
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between various powertrains (electric, hydrogen, hybrids) for clean transportation could
provide motivation for this extension, and it could deliver some insights for the analysis of
the relative efficiency of various public policies intended to promote their deployment (see
for instance Ro¨sler et al., 2014).
A second context in which this approach could be both interesting and relevant concerns
the cement sector. Indeed, this seems quite feasible since Ryan (2012) precisely provides
a numerical dynamic model of this industry for the US using the approach of Ericson and
Pakes (1995). He shows that the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment increased the setup cost
for new entrants by 20%, leading to higher market concentration, lower profit and loss
of consumer surplus. Building on the same approach, Perez-Saiz (2014) and Fowlie et al.
(2012) investigate how various regulatory policies may indirectly affect the market structure.
However, in these applied studies antitrust policies are not explicitly considered in spite of
their empirical relevance for cement.
.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that A1 = w1/r − K ≤ 0 implies that A2 ≤ 2A1 ≤ 0
because we have assumed that w2 − w1 ≤ w1. So A1 ≤ 0 implies the expression in (4) is
nonpositive and clearly maximized at p = 0.
Turn now to the case in which A1 > 0. Using expression (4) after multiplying through
by δ yields that
A1 − δW0 = A1[1− δ(1− p)
2]− δp2A2 − 2p(1− p)δA1
1− δ(1− p)2 ,
so expression (5) can be rewritten as
∂W0
∂p
= 2
p[1− (1− p)δ](A2 − A1) + (1− p)(1− δ)A1
[1− δ(1− p)2]2 . (7)
If A2 ≥ A1 (i.e. w2 − w1 ≥ rK) then ∂W0/∂p > 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] and W0 is maximized by
choosing p = 1.
If A2 < A1 (i.e. w2−w1 < rK), from (7) the derivative is positive for p = 0 and negative
for p = 1, so that (the numerator being a second order polynomial) both first-order and
second-order conditions are satisfied at (and only at)
pˆ =
r
2(A1 − A2)
[[
(2A1 − A2)2 + 4A1(A1 − A2)/r
]1/2 − (2A1 − A2)] .
Hence, W0(p) is maximized at p = p̂ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the welfare under duopoly, w2, is a decreasing function of
pi2 (recall that w2 ≡ w(2pi2)), it follows (from (7)) that
∂2W0
∂pi2∂p
=
4p[1− (1− p)δ]w′
[1− δ(1− p)2]2 < 0
and
∂2W0
∂K∂p
= −2{p[1− (1− p)δ] + (1− p)(1− δ)}
[1− δ(1− p)2]2 < 0.
The strict concavity of W0(p) whenever w1 ≥ rK > w2 − w1 yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to analyze the situation, it is worth considering the
expected consumers surplus:
S0(s1, s2, r, p) =
2p(1− p)s1/r + p2s2/r
1− δ(1− p)2 .
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Expected firms profits are null at equilibrium, so expected welfare is equal to expected
consumer surplus. Consumer surplus only depends indirectly, via the entry probability, on
the fixed cost K, property that will be exploited in what follows.
In particular, we show that the difference between the expected consumer surplus with
merger and the expected consumer surplus without merger is positive for large K. First,
note that the difference in expected consumers surplus is continuous and null for K = pi1/r.
Second, the effect of K on expected consumer surplus is (by analogy with equation (7)):
dS0
dK
=
∂S0
∂p
p∗0
∂K
= −2{p0[1− (1− p0)δ](s2 − s1) + (1− p0)(1− δ)s1}
(pi1 − pi2)[1− δ(1− p0)2]2 .
When K goes to pi1/r from below, the equilibrium probability goes to 0, and the derivative
of consumer surplus goes to −2(1− δ)s1/(pi1−pi2). Given that pi2 = pi1/2 with merger, while
pi2 < pi1/2 without merger, the derivative of the difference of consumers surplus is negative
for large K. Finally, the difference of expected consumers surplus with and without merger
is decreasing for large K and null at K = pi1/r, so there must be a range of K such that the
difference is positive.
Proof of Proposition 5. Welfare is quasi-concave with respect to the entry probability
(c.f. proof of Proposition 1). The equilibrium probability p∗0((1 + α)pi2, pi2, rK) is increasing
with respect to α. Therefore, welfare is first increasing then decreasing w.r.t. α, and it is
maximized either at an interior solution such that p∗0 = pˆ, or at α = 1. The former arises if
and only if p∗(2pi2, pi2, rK) > pˆ.
The equilibrium probability p∗0(2pi2, pi2, rK) is increasing w.r.t. pi2. The optimal prob-
ability pˆ is increasing with respect to the duopoly welfare w2 (from the first order condi-
tion (7)), so it is decreasing w.r.t. to the duopoly profit. Furthermore, for pi2 ≥ rK/2,
p∗(2pi2, pi2, rK) = 0 while pˆ > 0. Thus, there is pi2 > 0 such that α∗ = 1 if and only if
pi2 ≤ pi2.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us respectively denote WD0 (pi2) and W0(pi2) for the expected
welfare with divestiture (and optimal α) and the expected welfare without divestiture as
functions of pi2.
If pi2 ≥ pi2, then asset divestiture induces the optimal probability of entry given that
there is a post-entry duopoly. Without asset divestiture, the ex-post welfare is lower if one
firm enters, so the expected welfare is lower whatever the entry probability is. Therefore,
the expected welfare without divestiture is lower than the optimal expected welfare with
divestiture: W0(pi2) < W
D
0 (pi2). However, if pi2 < pi2 the expected welfare with divestiture
is sub-optimal, in the sense that the probability of entry is sub-optimal. The probability of
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entry is null for pi2 = rK/2, and W
D
0 is null for lower pi2 while W0(pi2) > 0 in such cases. By
continuity, there must exist pi2 ∈ (rK, pi2) such that WD0 (pi2) > W0(pi2) if and only if pi2 > pi2.
26
